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RECENT DECISIONS

pass from him because he no longer has the legal capacity to
retain it. So, if it is not otherwise disposed of, it must necessarily
revert to the bankrupt as the original owner from whom in the
first instance the trustee got title.
Clearly one person cannot lose
' 3
title without another getting it." "
Title should revert to the bankrupt subject to reopening proceedings,
which should be instituted when it appears that the bankrupt estate was
closed before being fully administered. Other state courts 1conclude
that title should revest in the bankrupt subject to the liens which were
valid at the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding.' 4
The most expedient rule and one followed by all decisions, except
the principal case, is that title to assets passes to the trustee whether they
be scheduled or unscheduled, since it must be deemed that once the
bankruptcy court assumes jurisdiction all the bankrupt's assets come
within its power. Once the trustee is discharged title must go somewhere for it cannot repose in a nonexistent trustee. Title to the assets
should reinvest in the bankrupt subject to reopening proceedings by
which creditors can successfully reach any assets which may subsequently appear. Any other approach seems to totally disregard the rules
applicable to trustees and also to unnecessarily burden bankruptcy court
procedure.
JOHN J. WITTAK

Insurance - Construction of Airplane Life and Accident Policy
An airplane life and accident insurance policy of the type sold in
vending machines at airports in the amount of $20,000 was issued to
one Smith by defendant to cover a round trip from Albuquerque, New
Mexico, to Washington, D. C., via TWA. The policy also provided
coverage if the original transportation ticket was exchanged for another
ticket issued by a scheduled airline covering all or any portion of the
trip specified in the original ticket. Smith was required by his employer
to go to Dallas, Texas, from Washington before returning to Albuquerque. A new ticket on another airline was purchased for the Dallas trip,
the old one not being exchanged. Smith purchased a $10,000 policy
covering that flight. The plane crashed and Smith was killed. Defendant paid the $10,000 but denied liability on the $20,000 policy. Judgment
was entered for the plaintiff, Smith's beneficiary, and the defendant
appealed. Held: Affirmed. The accident in which insured was killed
was covered by the policy even though the original ticket was not
exchanged. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Smith, 189 F. 2d
315, (10th Cir., 1951).
The court decided the case on the ground that an insurance policy
-

a Ibid.
34Normal State Bank v. Killian, 318 I1. App. 637, 48 N.E. 2d 212 (1943).
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shall be liberally construed in favor of the insured. In deciding in favor
of the plaintiff, the court apparently interpreted the exchange ticket
clause as having for its basic purpose coverage of the insured on a
substitute route. Therefore, it hesitated to give effect to the wording
of the clause which required an exchange of the old ticket. While under
the liberal construction doctrine the decision may be a sound one, a
problem arises as to where the line will or should be drawn.
The principle that an insurance policy shall be liberally construed in
favor of the insured cannot be applied generally. It only applies where
the provisions of the policy are ambiguous.' Here the provision in
question is unambiguous. The policy states clearly that insurance shall
apply only to injury sustained while the insured is traveling on his
original ticket or a ticket exchanged for it. Policies must be construed
to give effect to intention'and express language thereof. 2 Neither party
to an unambiguous insurance policy is to be favored in the construction
thereof, and it is the court's duty to enforce such contract as parties
made it.'
Even if the principle of liberal construction in favor of the insured
is applicable in the instant case, this doctrine has limitations. A court
has no power to enlarge or restrict, by artificial construction, liabilities
and benefits under an insurance policy. 4 Courts will not make a better
insurance contract for parties than they saw fit to make or alter the
contract for the benefit of a party. 5 It would seem that this case did
enlarge the insurer's obligation since it held that the insurance covered a
situation which did not come under the terms of coverage in the policy,
i.e., a distinct and different trip not a substitute for the original trip.
An insurance policy is a contract between insurer and insured and
courts are bound to give legal effect to it according to intent of parties,
and such intent is to be determined by the words of the contract when
they are clear and explicit. There appears to be no doubt as to the
meaning of the words of the policy. The terms could not reasonably be
intended to cover a passenger traveling on a different line on a new
ticket.
Nevertheless the beneficiary of the insured was permitted to recover,
the court's rationale being liberal construction. To what lengths shall a
1 Equitable

Life Assurance Society of U.S. v. Deem, 91 F. 2d 569 (4th Cir.,

(1937); Brown v. Tennessee Auto Insurance Co., 237 S.W. 2d 553 (Tenn.,
1951.)
2 Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Ansley, 22 Tenn, App. 456, 124 S.W. 37 (1939).
3Hill v. Standard Mutual Casualty Co., 110 F. 2d 1001 (7th Cir., 1940).
'Miami Jockey Club v. Union Assurance Society, 12 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Fla.,
1945); Aff'd. 82 F. 2d 558 (5th Cir., 1936). Union Paving Co. to use of
U.S. Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 186 F. 2d 172 (3rd Cir., 1951).
5 Illinois Banker's Life Assurance Co. v. Tennison, 202 Okla. 347, 213 P. 2d
848 (1949).
6 Boyd v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 218 La. 669, 50 So. 2d 688 (1951).
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court go in its construction of the terms of a contract of insurance? If
this decision is to be followed, does it mean that the insurance company
will be liable no matter to what extent the insured varies the original
route, as long as he intends eventually to return to his starting point?
The decision contains no limitation in this regard. The rule of liberal
construction cannot be used to refine away terms expressed with sufficient clearness to convey the plain meaning to the parties.7
Besides the principle of liberal construction, there is a cardinal
principle that all provisions in written contracts are entitled to their due
significance so far as consistently possible s The court does not seem
to have given sufficient consideration to this principle.
Further the meaning of the contract can also be ascertained by the
actions of the parties under it. 9 Here Smith's acts indicated he considered himself no longer covered by the insurance. His original policy
was for $20,000. Before starting for Dallas, he procured a $10,000
policy on that flight. Yet the maximum liability for one passenger is
$25,000. Was this the act of a man who considered his previous insurance still in effect? Hardly, since no one is apt to take more than the
maximum. Intent upon liberal construction the court apparently gave
no weight to the acts of the insured in construing this policy.
In a life insurance policy case it was said that a court will not
arbitrarily or artificially stretch the language in their interpretation, and
where there is no pretense of fraud, accident or mistake (and there is
none in the instant case) the actual language used will be followed.10
This seems to be a just and reasonable principle. Should it not be
followed in the interpretation of airplane policies as well ?" This would
prove a check on liberality of construction.
In the light of general insurance principles and previous decisions,
the instant case does not appear to be a sound one. At the same time,
this case is of some importance since it is the first case construing this
type of provision in an airplane life and accident policy, and therefore
sets a precedent. This decision should not be followed, for it is the
function of a court to interpret insurance policies, not re-write or draw
up new contracts for the parties.
JANICE MANNIX

7 Terry v. New York Life Insurance Co., 104 F. 2d 498 (8th Cir., 1939).

8 Barco v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 36 F. Supp. 932
(S.D. Fla., 1951).
9 Sulzbacher v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 137 F. 2d 386 (8th Cir., 1943).
'OQuigley v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Co., 86 P.L.J. 400; Affd.
136 Pa. Super. 27, 7 A. 2d 70 (1937).
"1VANCE ON INsURANcE, § 256 (1930). The same rules of law apply to the
making of special insurance contracts and to their construction as are applicable to other types of insurance.

